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Abstract: This article examines the ambiguous and often fraught relationship between 
the Fascist regime and nationalist movements in areas under British direct and indirect 
administration; it will focus primarily on the political and ideological relationship 
between Italy and Arab nationalist forces, but will also outline the regime’s seemingly 
contradictory overtures to the Zionist Revisionist movement. The evidence examined in 
this article illustrates that Mussolini’s ambition to restore Italian hegemony in the 
Mediterranean through propaganda and political contacts, and to compete with the 
European imperial powers of the time was not supported by a coherent imperial strategy, 
but reacted to diverse stimuli and opportunities that arose over time. 
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Introduction 
During the last twenty years, relations between Axis forces and political 
movements and national governments in the Arab Middle East have 
received considerable attention from diplomatic, political, military and 
cultural historians. Traditional historiography of Fascist Italy has 
located the development of Italian-Arab relations within the broader 
context of Fascist foreign policy, imperial expansion and, ultimately, 
appeasement. There is to date a well-recognised division between the 
Italian school, which downplays Mussolini’s imperial challenge and 
highlights his search for an understanding with Britain, and British and 
North American historians who have emphasised the regime’s 
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expansionist drive and its political and ideological dimensions.1 
However, broader discussions over the nature and directions of the 
regime’s foreign policy have limited the examination of more specific 
aspects of Fascist policy in the Middle East and the Muslim world. 
Such omissions have been recently addressed by new scholarly research 
that has examined strategies and means of engagement of Fascist Italy 
with nations and governments in the Arab Middle East, repositioning 
the region at the centre of both the regime’s foreign relations and 
Fascist historiography.2  
                                                 
1
 Work by Italian historians notably includes R. DE FELICE, Mussolini il duce. I. Gli anni 
del consenso, 1929-1936, Torino, Einaudi, 1974; R. DE FELICE, Arabi e Medio Oriente 
nella strategia politica di guerra di Mussolini (1940-1943), in «Storia Contemporanea», 
XVII, 6, dicembre 1986, pp. 1255-1359; R. QUARTARARO, Roma tra Londra e Berlino. 
La politica estera fascista dal 1930 al 1940, Roma, Bonacci, 1980; R. QUARTARARO, 
Imperial Defence in the Mediterranean on the Eve of the Ethiopian Crisis (July-October 
1935), in «The Historical Journal», XX, 1, March 1977, pp. 185-220; S. FABEI, Il fascio, 
la svastica e la mezzaluna, Milano, Mursia, 2002. For British and American 
historiography, see, for example, R.J.B. BOSWORTH, The Italian Dictatorship: Problems 
and Perspectives in the Interpretation of Mussolini and Fascism, London, Arnold, 1998; 
R. MALLETT, Mussolini and the Origins of the Second World War, 1933-1940, 
Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2003; M. KNOX, Mussolini Unleashed 1939-1941: 
Politics and Strategy in Fascist Italy’s Last War, Cambridge, Cambridge University 
Press, 1982; M. KNOX, The Fascist Regime, its Foreign Policy and its Wars: An “Anti-
Fascist” Orthodoxy?, in «Contemporary European History», IV, 3, November 1995, pp. 
346-365; M. KNOX, Conquest, Foreign and Domestic, in Fascist Italy and Nazi Germany, 
in «The Journal of Modern History», LVI, 1, March 1984, pp. 1-57; J. PETERSEN, La 
politica estera del fascismo come problema storiografico, in «Storia Contemporanea», 
III, 4, dicembre 1972, pp. 661-706. 
2
 N. ARIELLI, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933-40, London/New York, Palgrave, 
2010; N. ARIELLI, Italian Involvement in the Arab Revolt in Palestine, 1936-39, in 
«British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies», XXXV, 2, December 2008, pp. 187-204; M. 
FIORE, Anglo-Italian Relations in the Middle East, 1922-1940, Farnham, Ashgate, 2010; 
M. FIORE, La guerra delle parole. La propaganda anti-inglese di Radio Bari e le 
contromisure britanniche (1935-1940), in «Nuova Storia Contemporanea», XV, 1, 
gennaio-febbraio 2011, pp. 65-86; M. WILLIAMS, Mussolini’s Propaganda Abroad. 
Subversion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East, 1935-1940, London, Routledge, 
2006; M. WILLIAMS, Mussolini’s Secret War in the Mediterranean and the Middle East: 
Italian Intelligence and the British Response, in «Intelligence and National Security», 
XXII, 6, December 2007, pp. 881-904. 
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     This article builds on existing literature and available documentation 
to examine perceived ideological and political affinities that during the 
1930s and early 1940s underpinned the relations between nationalist 
forces and Fascist Italy in the Middle East. It claims that Britain’s 
strong and formalised presence in the region served to further an 
alliance, albeit a short-lived one, between radical nationalists and 
Mussolini’s regime, in which each side relied on the other to advance 
its political programmes and objectives. Such an alliance rested on 
some shared notions of nationalism, and in the case of Egypt especially, 
on vague anti-democratic and anti-parliamentarian ideas espoused by 
radical nationalist groups, which had found application in both Fascist 
Italy and Nazi Germany. However, co-operation between Arab 
nationalist forces and the Fascist regime remained broadly a confined 
phenomenon, and one that clearly illustrates the incoherent nature of 
Mussolini’s policy in the Middle East. If Arab nationalists had initially 
overlooked Italy’s imperialist ambitions, the ruthless repression of the 
Senussi in Libya and the dramatic events in Abyssinia cast serious 
doubts over this paradoxical partnership between anti-colonial forces 
and an aspiring colonial power. It became then apparent that the 
strengthening of political, military and cultural ties between the Arab 
nations and Fascist Italy would certainly challenge the presence of 
much-despised British advisers and authorities in the region; at the 
same time though, this would open the door to a more brutal form of 
colonial rule, one that had already shown great contempt for the lives of 
thousands of Muslims in North and East Africa. 
Manuela Williams 
 
88 
 
     In his examination of Nazi propaganda in the Arab world during the 
Second World War, Jeffrey Herf makes some insightful claims about 
the ideological currents that linked Berlin with the Arab world. Much of 
the literature on the Third Reich’s policies and attitudes towards the 
Middle East has until recently emphasised racial issues that would have 
prejudiced a long-term alliance between the Nazi regime and Arab 
nationalist forces.3 Herf, conversely, outlines reasons for co-operation 
between Berlin and the Arabs, when political developments in the 
Middle East, and in particular in Palestine, taught the Germans that 
«their hatred for the Jews was not unique and that they had at least 
some soul mates and allies» in the Arab world.4 Radical anti-Semitism 
here, just like resentment towards the British in the case of Italy, would 
constitute the cornerstone of the alliance between Arab and Muslim 
forces and the Nazi regime, a partnership that went beyond the mere 
convergence of interests, and required a deeper understanding of ideas, 
culture and religion on both sides. In the process, Herf claims, «Nazism 
became less Eurocentric while Arab and Islamic radicalism drew on 
modern, European totalitarian ideology».5 Herf’s work broadly 
endorses a traditional narrative of twentieth-century Arab history, 
which highlights the growing and pervasive influence of Nazi and 
Fascist ideological constructs and political systems on Arab politicians, 
                                                 
3
 See F. NICOSIA, Arab Nationalism and National Socialist Germany, 1933-1939: 
Ideological and Strategic Incompatibility, in «International Journal of Middle East 
Studies», XII, 3, November 1980, pp. 351-372; F. NICOSIA, The Third Reich and the 
Palestine Question, London, I.B. Tauris, 1985. 
4
 J. HERF, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
2010, p. 4. 
5
Ibid. 
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intellectuals and public opinions. However, recent studies have 
reconsidered this narrative and brought to the surface the hitherto silent 
liberal voices, the voices that continued to express with vigour their 
belief in the virtue of a democratic political system and a free society.6   
When assessing Arab relations with Fascist Italy during the 1930s, the 
political and ideological synthesis described by Herf does not appear to 
be a dominant attribute, nor does it feature prominently in Fascist 
propaganda in the Arabic language. Instead, Italian claims and 
associations in the Mediterranean and the Middle East rested upon 
perceived strong historical and cultural ties, on vague notions of 
nationalism and nationhood, and on the shared, and highly disputable as 
far as Italy was concerned, narrative of the oppressed against the 
oppressor. But the differences between Western European nationalism 
and the Arab experience were emphasised by some nationalist 
commentators. Emir Shakib Arslan, who flirted with Fascist Italy in the 
mid-1930s, highlighted the elements that set apart Arab and Western 
nationalisms, with the latter bent on conquest, driven by war and 
«tormented by greed and desire of domination».7 In direct contrast, 
Arslan believed that Oriental nationalism was «shaped by the Islamic 
doctrine which has given its followers moral purpose, discipline and 
has helped develop a society based on fraternity and justice»; a society 
                                                 
6
 See, for example, I. GERSHONI - J. JANKOWSKI, Confronting Fascism in Egypt: 
Dictatorship versus Democracy in the 1930s, Stanford, Stanford University Press, 2010; 
G. NORDBRUCH, Nazism in Syria and Lebanon: The Ambivalence of the German Option, 
1933-1945, London, Routledge, 2009; P. WIEN, Iraqi Arab Nationalism: Authoritarian, 
Totalitarian and Pro-Fascist Inclinations, 1932-1941, New York, Routledge, 2006. 
7
 S. ARSLAN, Nationalisme Arabe et nationalisme occidental, in «La Nation Arabe», II, 
Jouillet-Aout-Septembre 1932, p. 36. 
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that shies away from conquest and expansion but actively seeks to 
redress old injustices.8  
     For centuries, Italy and her political predecessors had been regarded 
as key players in diplomatic and commercial affairs connecting 
countries around the Mediterranean basin. Since the days of the 
Venetian republic, Italian had become the foremost international 
language for political interactions and commercial transactions outside 
the Ottoman empire. The French, in their first attempt to reinforce 
cultural and economic relations with the Ottoman Middle East, 
recognised the significant position attained by Italy during its long 
years of trading partnership with the Ottoman empire, and often 
employed Italian emissaries and business agents as French consular 
representatives in the region.9 This Mediterranean vocation remained 
central to the political identity and aspirations of liberal Italy and 
fostered sentiments of national and political empathy towards the claim 
of the emerging nationalist movements in the Levant, Middle East and 
North Africa. In the wake of the Balfour Declaration and of the Paris 
Peace conference of 1919 – whose outcomes had deeply disappointed 
both Italian and Arab nationalists, as the former had wished for 
territorial gains in Europe and Africa, the latter had hoped for the 
creation of a large independent Arab state – politicians and intellectuals 
of Liberal Italy lent a sympathetic ear to the claims and grievances 
conveyed by Arab nationalists touring Europe; the nationalist cause, not 
only Arab but also Indian, harnessed support from the Vatican, the 
                                                 
8
 Ibid. 
9
 See M. BURROWS, “Mission Civilisatrice”: French Cultural Policy in the Middle East, 
1860-1914, in «The Historical Journal», XXIX, 1, March 1986, p.111. 
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Italian government, the Italian Socialist Party, the Italian nationalists 
and the Fascist movement. Mussolini’s newspaper «Popolo d’Italia» 
directly addressed the increasing tension between Jewish and Arab 
communities in Palestine and claimed to be deliberately fanning Arab 
nationalist flames.  
     In the period leading up to Mussolini’s seizure of power in 1922, 
pro-Arab and anti-imperialist sentiments had come to dominate the 
Fascist discourse on foreign policy, sentiments that reflected the genesis 
of the Fascist movement as synthesis of existing cultural, political and 
artistic currents; of particular interest for the purpose of this article is 
the myth of Italy as a “proletarian” nation that would no longer submit 
to the hegemony of plutocratic “capitalist” ones such as Britain and 
France. The so-called “Fascists of the first hour” as well as the 
nationalists and the futurists were keen to display solidarity with other 
nations whose aspirations to independence had been quashed by the 
imperial armies and administrators of Britain and France. But as 
mentioned before, such feelings of solidarity were not confined to the 
politics and rhetoric of opposition movements; indeed they were shared 
and endorsed by the Liberal government who had refused to recognise 
the establishment of a British protectorate in Egypt at the outbreak of 
the First World War and had supported the emerging nationalist 
movement in Egypt through the words and activities of the Italian 
communities in Cairo, Alexandria and Port Said; so strong had become 
the bond between Egyptian nationalists and the government of Italy, 
some historians claim, that during the numerous public demonstrations 
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that took place in Egypt between 1920 and 1921, protesters repeatedly  
hailed Italy.10  
     Support to the Arab nationalist cause that had indeed characterised 
the foreign policy of Liberal Italy, despite the war in Libya in 1911 with 
its clear imperialistic connotations, was not abandoned by Mussolini; 
under the Fascist regime, the development of special relations with 
nationalist forces in the Arab world became paradoxically central to the 
policy of Italian expansion in the Mediterranean and the Middle East. 
Parallel to this nationalist dimension, the regime’s imperialist vocation 
became evident towards the end of the 1920s. The vague notion of 
imperialism espoused by the Fascist movement took then clearer and 
more tangible connotations: it became political and economic 
expansion into the Balkans and Africa combined with a project of 
extension of the totalitarian model and reorganisation of Europe and the 
colonies along a “new order” based on the leadership of the “young 
nations”, Italy and Germany. Central to Mussolini’s renewed imperial 
vocation was Italy’s hegemony in the Mediterranean.11 
     However, to achieve a position of power in the mare nostrum, and to 
further its political and economic interests in the Middle East and 
Levant, Italy had to seek an alliance with forces that could challenge 
the British imperial and mandatory system from within; it needed to 
ensure the friendship and compliance of Arab nationalists, who in turn 
would gain the protection of Mussolini’s government, the necessary 
diplomatic and political leverage, and financial and military support, to 
                                                 
10
 See S. FABEI, Il fascio, la svastica e la mezzaluna, Milano, Mursia, 2002, p. 28. 
11
 See E. GENTILE, Fascismo. Storia e interpretazione, Bari-Roma, Laterza, 2002, p. 29. 
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undermine the influence of British administrators. The alliance between 
Fascist Italy and Arab leaders would be forged mostly by propaganda. 
The main task awaiting Italian propagandists was to erase the violent 
colonial record of Italy in North Africa and Ethiopia, and to promote 
the image of Mussolini as the champion of modern Islam. However, the 
response generated by Italian propaganda in the Arab world was neither 
unanimously positive nor proportionate to the efforts made by the 
Italian government. Suspicion towards the real aims of Mussolini’s 
policy in the Middle East and resentment at his colonial undertaking in 
Africa dominated the feelings of the majority of the Arab leaders, 
eventually leaving the success of Italian propaganda confined to limited 
factions of the nationalist movement. 
     Notwithstanding Italy’s intention to appear as a “Muslim” power, in 
his intricate effort to exploit the forces of nationalism the Duce was also 
seeking to establish new, more profitable relations with the Zionist 
movement. In the aftermath of the First World War, the increasing 
Anglo-Italian rivalry in the Middle East and the policy of 
rapprochement with the Vatican had induced Mussolini to oppose 
Zionism as an instrument of British intervention in the Middle East. 
The Balfour Declaration (1917) had allowed the creation of a Jewish 
National Home in Palestine which was seen as a danger for Italian 
expansionist designs in the same area. Moreover, the Duce and other 
Italian nationalists began to fear that an influential Zionist movement 
could act as a rival nationalism and therefore alienate the Italian Jewish 
community. The Italian historian Renzo De Felice claimed that 
Mussolini’s seemingly contradictory attitude towards Italian Zionism 
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and international Zionism was in fact underpinned by logic and 
coherent assumptions. According to this view, the thought that the 
Zionists harboured feelings of allegiance to two homelands – with a 
strong preference for Palestine – was deeply disturbing to Mussolini’s 
«monolithic and exclusive concept of homeland», which turned the 
Italian Zionists «automatically into disagreeable suspects».12 The 
Duce’s perception of international Zionism was more sympathetic, De 
Felice maintained, and in the 1930s Mussolini saw the Revisionist 
movement and its most outspoken anti-British leaders as useful allies 
and a vehicle to disrupt British presence in the Eastern Mediterranean. 
Attempting to reconstruct a more coherent narrative of Mussolini’s 
foreign policy in the Middle East, De Felice concluded that «the Zionist 
card, just as at a later date the Arab card […] was for Mussolini a pawn 
that could also be used in his Mediterranean game».13 
     Therefore, in the early 1930s Mussolini, in search of a more 
successful approach to the Middle Eastern question and still lacking a 
coherent long-term policy towards the dominant forces in the Near 
East, «was determined to maintain (and if possible enhance) his 
reputation as a friend and protector of the Jews».14 In the period 
between 1934 and 1935, the Italian dictator met some of the most 
charismatic figures of the Zionist movement, assuring them of his 
support for a Jewish National Home. Attempting to replace British 
                                                 
12
 R. DE FELICE, The Jews in Fascist Italy: A History, New York, Enigma Books, 2001, 
p.150. 
13
 Ibid., p.151. 
14
 M. MICHAELIS, Mussolini and the Jews: German-Italian Relations and the Jewish 
Question in Italy 1922-1945, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978, p. 62. 
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influence in the region, Mussolini conveyed his desire to champion the 
creation of a Jewish state small enough to be accepted by the Arabs and 
that, at the same time, would open the door to Italian influence in 
Palestine. 
 
Confronting nationalism in the Arab world 
 
The Italian regime’s casual and short-lived interest in Zionism, and in 
particular Revisionist Zionism, markedly contrasts with the systematic 
effort to build a solid partnership with Arab nationalist forces in North 
Africa and the Levant during the period 1934-1940. It was in the mid-
1930s that, whilst flirting with Revisionist Zionism, the Fascist regime 
began acknowledging claims and grievances of the Arab community in 
Palestine. The political appreciation of the Palestinian events in 1935 
and 1936 circulated within the Italian government illustrates sensitivity 
to the deepening of racial and religious division that was threatening the 
political stability of the whole area. The opportunity to attack British 
conduct in Palestine could not be missed. The Italians perceived the 
tumultuous circumstances that led to the beginning of the 1936 Arab 
revolt as the result of a substantially ambiguous policy formulated by 
the government in London whose ultimate objective was the defence of 
the imperial interests and the creation of an efficient naval base in Haifa 
that would host the British Mediterranean fleet. Despite having initially 
tried to win the sympathy of the Arabs without generating discontent 
among the Jews, the British government had eventually succumbed to 
the “influence of the Zionists”. According to Italian sources, the very 
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few concessions granted to the Arab Palestinians were offset by 
measures adopted in favour of the Jewish community: after the long 
dispute over the establishment of a legislative council that would take 
into account Arab grievances, the British authorities in Palestine had 
endeavoured to regain popularity among the Jews by granting legal 
status to many of those who had entered Palestine illegally and allowed 
the new colonists to purchase arms for defence in case of unprovoked 
aggression.15 Indeed, the Arab rebellion of 1936-1939 brought to a 
sudden end the already fragile relationship between Zionism, and in 
particular Revisionist Zionism, and the Fascist regime. 
     In the increasingly violent Arab-Jewish dispute over Palestinian 
land, the Italian government seems to have taken a fairly explicit 
position in support of Arab claims. The reason for that is not to be 
found in an anti-Semitic prejudice motivating the decisions taken in 
Rome, but in political and strategic considerations: in the eyes of the 
Italians, a powerful and independent Jewish community in Palestine, 
and eventually a Jewish state, would provide a solid and permanent 
base for Britain in the Mediterranean. The arrival of Jewish immigrants 
was then seen within the context of a deliberately aggressive policy 
carried out by the Zionist movement with the complicity of the British 
government, an expedient aiming at reducing the Arabs of Palestine to a 
numerical minority. Hence, the turbulent and sometimes extreme 
reaction of the Arab community, through petitions, rallies and protests 
                                                 
15
 See Situazione politica in Palestina, 1935, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, GFM 36/508. Italian 
captured documents are kept together with material from the German Foreign Ministry, 
hence their class mark GFM. GFM 36, in particular, are the files photocopied from the 
Italian Ministry of Popular Culture and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
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that were gradually turning into riots. The objective was to defend the 
Palestinian soil «against the Jewish conquest», obstructing Jewish 
immigration, placing a veto to land sales and introducing an 
independent local government. Facing a “mortal threat” to their very 
existence and an opponent that had found apparent support in the 
British High Commissioner, the Arabs had begun to defend their rights 
and the course of events in Palestine was regarded in Rome as a prelude 
to more dramatic future developments.16 Italian endorsement of the 
Arab cause became even more explicit as a clear division of camps 
gradually emerged both in Europe and in the Middle East. Thus Italian 
propaganda bluntly presented the Axis coalition as the saviour of the 
Arab world. In a communiqué issued in the name of the Axis powers 
and broadcast in English, Italian propagandists claimed:  
 
«The Arab populations of the Levant must be freed from the yoke of 
their present masters interested only in their capitalistic and imperialistic 
achievements. […] Arab patriots in Palestine, Egypt, Iraq, Syria and 
Trans Jordan – and all those who have not been contaminated by British 
gold – know well the consequences of Britain’s rule, they know how 
much grief and bloodshed Britain has caused in Palestine and in the 
other Arab countries; finally they know that it is in the interest of Fascist 
Italy that the Arab nations of the Levant attain their freedom and 
independence».17 
 
     The myopic and schizophrenic directions of Italian foreign policy 
would become evident in the 1930s when despite Italian outright 
support of Arab nationalist demands, Italy’s prestige in the Arab world 
was seriously undermined by the war in Abyssinia and by the events in 
                                                 
16
 See ibid. 
17
 Comunicato trasmesso in inglese, undated, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, GFM 36/14. 
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Libya. The harsh regime imposed in Tripolitania and Cyrenaica by the 
Italian Governor of Libya, General Pietro Badoglio, was subsequently 
mitigated by Italo Balbo, appointed as the new Governor in 1933. 
Pursuing a policy of pacification, Balbo promoted the repatriation of 
thousands of Cyrenaican exiles from Egypt. At the same time though, 
he endeavoured to build a strong and large community of Italian 
nationals in Libya who would one day be able to resist the surge of 
Arab nationalism.18 The contradictions of Italian policies in Libya were 
recognised by nationalist forces in some Arab capitals; Galeazzo Ciano, 
the Italian Foreign Minister, noted in his diary on 4th January 1939:  
 
«At Baghdad there have been demonstrations against our mass 
immigration to Libya; they think this nucleus of Italians will break 
the Arabic preponderance in the Mediterranean. They are right, 
this is our objective, but the Duce wanted me to reassure the 
minister of Iraq».19 
 
In a long editorial that examined Italy’s expansionist drive in the 
Mediterranean and in Africa, «La Nation Arabe» noted in 1931 that 
within less than twenty years the Italian state had attempted to reclaim 2 
million hectares of land in Tripolitania and as much in Cyrenaica to 
make room for 2 to 3 million of Italian settlers in north Africa.20  
     Italy’s colonial ambitions had not gone unnoticed: by 1935, 
Mussolini’s plans for expansion in East and North Africa had become 
clear. In Palestine, the Jewish press echoed the call for international 
                                                 
18
 See ARIELLI, Fascist Italy and the Middle East, 1933-40, cit., p. 28. 
19
 Ciano’s Diary, 1937-1943, London, Phoenix Press, 2002, p.173. 
20
 See “Procédés de guerre moyenageux ressuscités per les italiens fascistes”, in «La 
Nation Arabe», I, Avril 1931, p. 9. 
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sanctions put forward by the British government at the League of 
Nations; more worryingly for the Italians, Arab newspapers and 
periodicals voiced Arab solidarity with their Muslim brothers of 
Abyssinia who were fighting for freedom against another imperialistic 
European power. Notwithstanding this, officials in Rome were quite 
certain that, after the first wave of indignation that had seized Arab 
public opinion against the Abyssinian “adventure” had subsided, Italy 
would gradually succeed in regaining the trust of the Arab peoples and 
leadership, eager to find an external champion to their cause. However, 
they claimed that Britain had plotted to incite the Arabs against Italy 
exploiting the threat of Italian colonial ambitions. British officials in 
Palestine, for their part, appeared increasingly puzzled by the influence 
exerted by the Fascist government over some Arab nationalist circles.  
     Although often dismissive of the political power and popularity of 
nationalist and pan-Arab ideas, British officials in London and – 
especially – in Palestine were weary of the convergence of nationalist 
forces and Fascist regime, which could progressively and rapidly erode 
from within Britain’s influence at the periphery of the empire.  Police 
reports and telegrams from British representatives in Palestine were 
read with growing discomfort at the Foreign and Colonial Offices, and 
provided often detailed accounts of anti-British propaganda and 
activities organised by Italian agents and their Arab collaborators.  
 
Seeking friends among the Arabs: Mussolini and Emir Shakib Arslan 
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Emir Shakib Arslan constitutes perhaps one of the most intriguing and 
controversial linkages between Fascist Italy and nationalist circles in 
the Arab world. His name had appeared very frequently in weekly and 
monthly intelligence and police reports sent from Palestine to London 
since 1934, when the Foreign Office opened a new file containing 
information on all the most prominent figures in Syrian politics. The 
assessment of Shakib Arslan’s activities is both bitter and 
contemptuous. «La nation arabe», the publication created in Geneva by 
Shakib Arslan in 1930, was described as «an incendiary and puerile 
journal»; the portrayal of Arslan was certainly not more flattering, he 
was described as «intelligent, self-seeking, treacherous».21 In truth, 
during the course of his life and career, Shakib Arslan remained 
committed to the cause of Islamic, rather than Arab, unity. To this end, 
he had supported the partnership with the Turks, while serving as a 
member of the Ottoman Parliament between 1913 and 1918; at the 
outbreak of the First World War, he had been an outspoken supporter of 
the alliance between Istanbul and Germany. His hostility towards 
British and French presence in the Levant led him to seek support in the 
most unusual quarter; his praise of the Italian Fascist regime, albeit 
short-lived, severely undermined his credibility among mainstream 
Arab nationalists. Shakib Arslan, however, believed that Fascist Italy 
posed less of a threat to Islamic unity than Britain and France, the major 
European colonial powers; furthermore, he felt that Mussolini’s regime 
                                                 
21
 Record of Leading Personalities in Syria, August 26, 1936, NATIONAL ARCHIVES, FO 
371/20018/E5398/209/89. 
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might prove a useful ally in the fight to dismantle the much-reviled 
Mandate system.  
     A writer, journalist, political activist and diplomat, Shakib Arslan is 
representative of a generation of Arabs born and brought up under the 
Ottoman Empire and who were suddenly confronting the emergence of 
a powerful Arab nationalist movement and new concepts of self-
determination and nation state. Born in 1869 in a Lebanese village and 
member of a Druze family (he was the grandfather of Druze leader and 
Lebanese politician Walid Jumblatt), Shakib Arslan received a broad 
education at the Christian preparatory school and subsequently 
completed his studies in Islamic sciences and Ottoman Turkish at the 
governmental institution of Madrasah al-Sultaniyyah. His literary talent 
was rather precocious: at the age of fourteen he saw his first poetry 
published in Arabic journals, four years later his collection of poems 
Prémices was published as a book. The seven years spent at the 
Christian Maronite school provided him with access to the intellectual 
and literary circles of Beirut and Damascus; his flair for writing would 
help him in his future career as a journalist and politician, gaining 
respect and admiration as well as criticism for the often ambiguous 
political stance reflected in his articles and prose. Although he did not 
take his education to university level, Shakib Arslan enjoyed the 
acquaintance and protection of some of the most influential political 
and religious thinkers of his time, like the celebrated Islamic reformer 
Muhammad Abduh. The idea of Islamic unity was central to Arslan’s 
political vision, for the rise of a strong Islamic power would contain the 
expansion of Europe into the Arab world. 
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     At the outbreak of the First World War, Arslan, still loyal to the 
imperial policies of the Ottoman empire and its universal Islamic 
aspirations, decided to give his personal contribution and joined the 
Ottoman army. Here, the first of his unwise associations: although 
many Arabs had initially given their support to the Caliphate in its war 
against the Western powers, many had also distanced themselves from 
those Ottoman rulers, like Ahmad Jamal Pasha, whose policy of terror 
had alienated large sectors of the Syrian opinion to the Ottoman 
government. Arslan’s relation with Jamal Pasha, as twenty years later 
with Mussolini, generated suspicion and disapproval, by linking him 
«in the minds of many Arabs to the harsh regime of the most hated of 
Turks».22 
     During the final years of the war, Arslan was in Istanbul, taking care 
of his responsibilities in the Ottoman parliament. In 1918 he was sent to 
Berlin to harness support for the Ottoman cause. But the collapse of the 
Empire was imminent; in Germany, Arslan learnt of the victory of the 
Allies and the armistice. He believed it dangerous to return to a British 
occupied Istanbul and preferred to remain in Europe, travelling from 
Germany to Switzerland, Russia and Italy always following with great 
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attention the political developments in the Levant and tirelessly 
campaigning for Syrian independence. Condemned to death in absentia 
for his role in the Syrian revolution of 1925-1926, Arslan remained in 
exile in Europe for almost twenty years until 1937, when the French 
authorities in Syria, attempting to encourage the dialogue with the 
moderate fringes of the Arab nationalist movement, granted to him and 
his long time collaborator, Ishan al-Jabiri, permission to make their way 
back to the country. In Switzerland, his activities received new impetus; 
with al-Jabiri he recreated the Permanent Delegation of the Syrian-
Palestinian Congress and set up office at 21 Glacis de Rive in Geneva, 
the city that had become the home of the newly-established League of 
Nations. From his office, Arslan would lobby the League of Nations to 
harness support for Syrian independence through letters, memoranda 
and petitions. The flurry of activities generated turned the Syrian-
Palestinian Delegation into «a focus for Arab hopes in the interwar 
years».23 
     During the first years of his European exile, Arslan’s political 
horizon enlarged considerably: until then he had been committed to 
promoting the interests of a single nation, Syria; now, the scope of his 
intense political and literary activity had broadened to encompass the 
issues of Arab nationalism and anti-imperialist struggle. He travelled 
extensively from Berlin, to Rome and Brussels to preside over, co-
ordinate or simply participate to political protests that increased his 
popularity among the other Arab exiled and refugees in Europe as well 
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as his compatriots in his homeland. Arslan had, by the early 1930s, 
defined his “mission” as a leading figure and promoter of a number of 
cultural and political nationalist movements that were flourishing in the 
Middle East and North Africa. He employed his talent as a writer to 
«internationalize the issues facing the Arab-Islamic lands under 
European domination and to galvanize Arab-Islamic opinion into 
recognition that only through mutual assistance based on common 
Islamic bonds could they gain independence and restore the proper 
social order».24 
      Arslan’s simultaneous engagement on many fronts, however, 
generated mixed feelings, as some admired his fervour and total 
dedication to the Arab cause, others were more sceptical and saw him 
as an ambitious manipulator, a meddler and a political agitator. His 
previous alliance with some of the most ruthless Ottoman commanders 
had not been completely forgotten or forgiven; to regain the esteem of 
many of his earlier followers, Arslan was now determined to put «his 
words and his pen at the service of the Arab movement and Arab unity, 
acting as a mediator and, by embracing an impeccable Muslim 
orthodoxy, he attempted to dispel the mistrust that he might have 
caused among the Arabs».25  
     Geneva undoubtedly provided a fertile environment for Arslan’s 
activities; here, the presence of the secretariat of the League of Nations 
and a large number of political refugees welcome by the Swiss 
government had contributed to creating an unrivalled forum for world 
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politics as well as a unique centre for the defence of the rights and 
aspirations of the Arab peoples.26 Geneva hosted numerous Arab 
committees and delegations whose ideas were circulated through a 
number of pamphlets, journals and publications of various nature. It 
was in Geneva that eventually Shakib Arslan founded in 1930, together 
with Ishan al-Jabiri, the periodical «La nation arabe», organ of the 
Syrian-Palestinian delegation in Europe and whose objective was «to 
present to the Western world the demands of a nation which has 
projected its civilising light across the darkness of the Middle Ages and 
the ruins of the Greco-Roman world and thus served as one of the 
principal agents in the formation of the modern world».27  
     A monthly review of politics, literature, economics and social issues, 
«La nation arabe» was intended to amplify Arslan’s personal 
engagement in supporting the claims of his people as well as a voice of 
the whole Arab nation who had recently become aware of the 
importance of solidarity and common intents in the strive for 
independence. Between 1930 and 1938, 38 issues of «La nation arabe» 
were discontinuously published and mostly sponsored by Arslan’s 
personal finances, providing the Syrian writer with invaluable 
opportunities to cultivate useful contacts in the political establishments 
of some of the European powers. It was during the years in Geneva and 
through the pages of «La nation arabe» that Arslan had sought a 
rapprochement with the Italian government whose violent conquest of 
Libya and the ruthless regime imposed on the Libyan populations had 
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caused great dismay among Arab public opinions. When Italy, seeking 
to rehabilitate its image in the Middle East and North Africa, converted 
to a more conciliatory attitude towards the Arabs of Libya, Arslan 
found that the Syrian-Palestinian cause and his own paper could benefit 
from a precious political and financial support. The new alliance 
inflicted a severe blow to Arslan’s restored credibility among Arab 
intellectuals, leading him into some of the «most twisted polemics of 
his career’ and subjecting him ‘to fierce attacks on his integrity».28  
     Arslan’s friendship with Mussolini began in 1933 and the Italian 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs hoped that gaining Arslan’s acquiescence 
would move Italian-Arab relations in a different direction. The brutal 
repression of the Arab tribes of Libya, and especially the atrocities and 
summary executions perpetrated in Libya under the stern regime 
imposed by the Italian Colonel Graziani, had set the rest of the Arab 
world against Italy. In «La nation arabe», before Arslan’s change of 
mind, had commented on Graziani’s repression of the Libyan rebellion: 
«We do not believe that such measures represent an achievement 
whatsoever for Italy: on the contrary, they will only serve to inflame 
hatred and hinder the prosperity of both countries. The Arabs will not 
be the only ones who will be hurt».29 In 1934, Shakib Arslan accepted 
Mussolini’s invitation to Rome on condition that Italy softened its 
policy towards the populations of Libya and allowed those Libyan 
tribes that had been deported to be repatriated. The effects of the deal 
that had allegedly been struck in Rome became soon evident. In the 
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issue of September-October 1934 of «La nation arabe», the tone of 
Arslan’s commentary on Italy’s colonial policy is extremely friendly, 
especially considering the anti-colonialist and anti-imperialist 
tendencies within the Syrian-Palestinian Delegation and the Arab 
nationalist movement, whose aspirations had always driven Arslan’s 
work. It was not an easy task, but the Syrian journalist seemed to have 
accepted the challenge to turn Mussolini from the villain of Libya and 
the ruthless invader of Abyssinia into the champion of modern Islam. 
“L’Italie en Erythrée. Comparaisons avec d’autres puissances 
colonisatrices” is a manifest praise of Italy’s virtues and successes in 
administrating Abyssinia compared with the despotic yoke the Muslims 
of other nations, «although more advanced than those of Eritrea», had 
been brought under.30 It is legitimate to ask whether the intense rhetoric 
used by Arslan was skilfully intended to appeal to the emotions of the 
reader or genuinely reflected the author’s Italophile feelings and 
gratitude for the «wise and fruitful policy adopted by Italy in its East 
African colony», where Muslims had been awarded seats in the high 
ranks of the administration, and the Islamic faith and the Arab culture 
and language were protected under the benevolent Italian patronage. 
Italy had, according to Arslan, mended its torn relations with the Arabs, 
the deplorable events of Libya belonged to the past: finally and «luckily 
the “duce”, whose spirit and high feelings did not match the measures 
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taken, and who had never agreed with foolish initiatives, has without 
delay put right the harm caused».31 
     Arslan’s partnership with Mussolini, whether based on sincere 
esteem of Italy’s conduct in North and East Africa or on convenient 
convergence of interests, soon produced its fruits. Apart from financial 
contributions to his precarious publication, Arslan acquired a solid 
political backing to his campaign against British and French presence in 
the Middle East. Arslan was most probably aware of the real aims of 
Italy’s foreign policy; he was using Italy to further Arab grievances and 
aspirations as much as Italy was endorsing the Arab cause to strengthen 
its prestige and credibility in the Arab world. In a letter published by 
the Palestinian newspaper «al Moqattan» in 1935 and allegedly 
addressed to the Mufti of Jerusalem, the Syrian writer declared his 
satisfaction at the understanding reached with Mussolini, and his trust 
in the Italian authorities who would “not dare” treat the Arab 
populations «in the same manner as did France and Great Britain».32 
From the letter it is possible to infer that arrangements for a co-
ordinated propaganda campaign had been made between Arslan and 
Mussolini and that, in case of war, those arrangements were to be 
executed as soon as possible. The Italian Undersecretariat for Press and 
Propaganda – later renamed Ministry for Popular Culture – would 
provide the necessary material for publication, which would also to be 
distributed to other newspapers in Palestine. Arslan added a twist and 
sought to transform Italy’s colonial adventure in Abyssinia into Italy’s 
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triumphal liberation of the Muslims of Abyssinia: «My opinion is this, 
that we should seize the opportunity of the dispute between Italy and 
Abyssinia in order to show the Islamic world the evils of the 
Abyssinians towards the Mohammedans».33  
 
Nationalist and radical movements in Egypt 
 
The paradoxical relationship between Arab nationalists and Fascist Italy 
remains at the heart of this article for despite all the inconsistencies of 
Italian foreign policy between 1930 and 1936 Italian policy-makers had 
understood that nationalism was the force that would corrode the 
structure of the British empire from within. The network of personal 
contacts developed by Fascist representatives and Arab nationalist 
forces was not unique to Palestine. In Egypt Italian diplomats failed to 
engage with mainstream nationalist forces such as the WAFD and 
resorted to courting more radical political organisations that operated 
on the fringes of parliamentary life. The 1930s witnessed a growing 
interest in European politics and in particular on contemporary Fascism 
among the Egyptian educated classes; such an interest was reflected in 
public discussions on the merits of the new authoritarian and totalitarian 
regimes emerged in Europe versus the virtues of liberal democratic 
systems. However, despite the proliferation of youth and paramilitary 
organisations that mimicked Fascist rhetoric and practices, recent 
studies convincingly argue that «Egyptian attitudes towards 
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authoritarian fascism and liberal democracy were neither uniform nor 
static».34  
     In the 1930s, at the height of the constitutional crisis in Egypt, the 
WAFD proved to be an elusive, if not hostile, counterpart. Fascist Italy 
and Egyptian WAFD were never very close: the Italian government was 
regarded with suspicion and hostility due to its links with the Egyptian 
Palace and its ruthless policy in North and East Africa. Furthermore, 
the democratic parliamentary principles underpinning the Wafdist 
policies were incompatible with the militarism and authoritarianism of 
Fascist ideology. In 1932 the Italian philosopher Giovanni Gentile 
together with Mussolini wrote The Doctrine of Fascism, which was 
published as an entry in the Italian Encyclopaedia. Here, the tenets of 
the Fascist doctrine were for the first time laid out; contempt and 
distaste for the democratic process is evident:  
 
«[…] Fascism denies that numbers, as such, can be the determining 
factor in human society; it denies the right of numbers to govern by 
means of periodical consultations; it asserts the irremediable and fertile 
and beneficent inequality of men who cannot be levelled by any such 
mechanical and extrinsic device as universal suffrage. Democratic 
regimes may be described as those under which the people are, from 
time to time, deluded into the belief that they exercise sovereignty, while 
all the time real sovereignty resides in and is exercised by other and 
sometimes irresponsible and secret forces».
35 
 
Likewise, Italy’s imperial aspirations were clearly spelt out. This is a 
clear message that should have crushed the hopes of nationalists like 
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Arslan who had actively sought the support of the Fascist regime to 
remove Britain’s and France’s colonial presence from the Arab world:  
 
«Imperial power, as understood by the Fascist doctrine, is not only 
territorial, or military, or commercial; it is also spiritual and ethical. […]  
Fascism sees in the imperialistic spirit -- i.e. in the tendency of nations to 
expand – a manifestation of their vitality. In the opposite tendency, which 
would limit their interests to the home country, it sees a symptom of 
decadence».36 
 
The Italian government was well aware of the distrust and animosity 
felt within the WAFD and expressed by the Egyptian press close to the 
nationalist party.37 The Egyptian newspapers «al Jihad» and «al 
Balagh», for example, voicing Wafdist concerns, campaigned against 
«Italian atrocities in Libya», the inhuman treatment the Senussi tribe, 
and the «martyrdom of Omar el-Muktar».38 However, Italian claims 
that the «al Balagh» was controlled by the British government were 
wide of the mark. Towards the end of 1935, Radio Bari, the mouthpiece 
of Italian propaganda in the Middle East established in 1934 by 
Galeazzo Ciano, retaliated and reported that the Egyptian press had 
been unanimously criticising the policy of the Prime Minister Nessim 
Pasha, considered to be too easily influenced by Britain. Among the 
newspapers at the forefront of the campaign, the «al Balagh» stated that 
Britain had taken «advantage of the weakness of the present cabinet to 
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make Egypt a British colony and to return to the regime of 1914».39 
These were certainly not the remarks of Anglophile reporters. 
     However, the broadening of the Egyptian political spectrum offered 
Fascist Italy opportunities for new alliances. In the early and mid-
1930s, the emergence of militant and regimented youth organisations – 
such as the Muslim Brotherhood, the WAFD-sponsored Blue Shirts, the 
Green Shirts, and the Young Egypt – was a clear sign of the 
transformation of the core values of Egyptian nationalism. Some 
scholars have emphasised that these newly born groups imitated 
«fascist behaviours and symbols and, while spreading continual 
violence, had the effect of rapidly and irrevocably undermining Egypt’s 
parliamentary system».40 It could be argued, however, that the very 
existence of an intense political debate is a testimony to the health of 
the Egyptian democracy. The anti-parliamentary tendencies and 
paramilitary behaviour manifested by youth organisations in Egypt 
certainly appealed to the Italian authorities who were looking for an 
amenable interlocutor. Among these nationalist offspring, for example, 
the Young Egypt was born in 1933 as a “patriotic society” working to 
reform the social and political system in Egypt. The paramilitary 
structure of the organisation and the “martial spirit” promoted by its 
members were complemented by the use of a wide range of modern 
propaganda techniques.  
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     The Young Egypt found its small but loyal core supporters in the 
middle class educated youth of the Egyptian University in Cairo, and in 
a young generation of teachers, intellectuals and governmental 
bureaucrats. Direct action, marches and rallies were often employed by 
members of the Young Egypt together with propaganda through press 
and pamphlets. It has been observed that «pressure was brought on 
public officials through the publication of open letters and the 
collection of signed petitions calling for such things as British 
evacuation of their military forces from Egypt and the Sudan, the 
abolition of the Capitulary system and Mixed Courts, and the 
introduction of universal military conscription in Egypt».41 
     Both Italian and British records seem to identify the Young Egypt as 
the political force that was most receptive to the values and messages of 
the Fascist regime. The Young Egypt had found a source of political 
and financial support, Italy had found a cause to champion. Through the 
channels opened by the Italian journalist Ugo Dadone, by many 
regarded as the architect of Fascist propaganda in Egypt in the 1930s, 
and his Egyptian collaborators, the Italians consular offices of Cairo 
successfully approached the leadership of the Young Egypt; the 
movement would be at the forefront of a new anti-British campaign 
designed to exploit the volatile political situation and further weaken 
the already fragile Anglo-Egyptian relations. Attempting to strike a 
cord with the radicalised youth of Egypt, the Fascist regime – the 
«revolutionary and radical» regime of the «young and virile Italians» – 
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claimed to be prepared to back the Egyptian cause to the extent of 
«assisting a revolution to secure full Egyptian independence».42 This, 
however, was not to last. As Italy’s ambitions to replace Britain as the 
leading colonial power in the Middle East began to emerge, the gap 
between the Fascist authorities and Egyptian militant nationalist groups 
– who had initially been inclined to «identify with Mussolini, the 
enemy of the British enemy» – became unbridgeable.43 
 
Italian Fascism and Revisionist Zionism 
 
The development of closer relations between Fascist Italy and 
nationalist forces in Egypt and Palestine is not the only story to be told 
here. For a brief period, in search of widespread political support, the 
Fascist regime, oblivious of its own contradictions, sought, although 
sometimes half-heartedly, a dialogue with the Zionist leadership. 
Mussolini’s relations with the Italian and the international Jewish 
Community were rather tortuous; eager to play the role of the mediator 
between the Jews and Nazi Germany, the Duce, according to one 
historian, «resumed his diplomatic tightrope walking between the two, 
alternately attacking and defending both».44  If anti-Semitism had not 
been endemic under the Liberal government, the early 1920s saw the 
emergence of anti-Judaic sentiments that were often expressed through 
publications that identified the Jews as the corrupting force within 
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Italian society – as well as culture, the arts and the economy – and 
highlighted the role of the Italian Jewry within the international 
bolshevik-plutocratic-masonic conspiracy; the Jews had become «the 
silent, new organism, that like woodworms are not discovered until they 
start gnawing holes».45 The extent of overt and latent anti-Semitism in 
Italy prior to and during the Fascist years is still the subject of a vibrant 
historical debate that revolves around the reaction generated among the 
Italians by the racial laws of 1938.46 The implementation of anti-
Semitic legislation, according to a growing number of historians, 
although part of the increasing alignment between Rome and Berlin, 
should be regarded as a clear expression of racism, which «was 
endemic in Fascism, and in large sectors of Italian society before the 
Fascist period».47 Evidence to this claim is offered by the brutal 
repression of the nationalist rebellion in Libya, by war crimes in 
Ethiopia, by the harsh treatment of Slav minorities in the North East of 
Italy. Yet, by many account the Italian Jewish population of some 
40,000 individuals was well integrated and some of the leaders of the 
community had developed over time close relations with the leadership 
of the Fascist Party.  
     During the first half of 1930s, the increasing rivalry with Hitler, the 
deterioration of German-Italian relations and the need to present to the 
                                                 
45
 M. MARTELLI, La propaganda razziale in Italia, 1938-1943, Rimini, Il Cerchio, 2005, 
p.13 
46
 See, for example, A. VISANI, Italian Reactions to the Racial Laws of 1938 as Seen 
through the Classified Files of the Ministry of Popular Culture, in «Journal of Modern 
Italian Studies», XI, 2, June 2006. 
47
 J. DUNNAGE, Twentieth Century Italy: A Social History, London, Longman, 2002, 
p.107. 
Manuela Williams 
 
116 
 
western public opinion the superiority of “Roman” Fascism over «the 
crude Teutonic imitation», prompted Mussolini to deepen his 
relationship with the Zionist leaders.48 In the period between 1934 and 
1935, the Italian dictator met some of the most charismatic figures of 
the Zionist movement, assuring them of his support for a Jewish 
National Home. Seeking to expand Italian influence in Palestine, where 
the fierce confrontation between the Arab and Jewish communities was 
weakening Britain’s mandatory policies, Mussolini indicated that Italy 
would support the creation of a Jewish state small enough to be 
accepted by the Arabs and that, at the same time, would further Italian 
presence and commercial interests in the area. Furthermore, support 
from the international Zionist network could be harnessed to undermine 
Britain’s influence in Europe and within the League of Nations. The 
latter turned to be a very appealing proposition in the wake of the 
Abyssinian crisis, when two representatives of the Italian Jewish 
community agreed to meet Chaim Weizmann in London on behalf of 
Mussolini to warn the Zionist leader that supporting the application of 
sanctions against Italy would have serious consequences as it would 
draw Italy into the arms of Nazi Germany and confine Palestine under 
Britain’s domination.49 
     In Palestine, the Fascist regime strengthened its relations with the 
Revisionist movement as a potential ally against British presence in the 
area. During the last decade, scholarly research has cast new light over 
the seemingly ambiguous relations established between the Jewish 
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Revisionist movement and the Nazi and Fascist regimes. Recent studies 
have sought to prove that the alliance between a Fascist power and a 
Zionist movement was not as paradoxical as it might have at first 
appeared, as both Fascism and Revisionist Zionism found their 
ideological roots in the inter-war European radical right.50 On 
pragmatic grounds the already divided Revisionist leadership was also 
looking for a country that would support the establishment of a Jewish 
state, thus hoping to compel the British government to relinquish its 
mandatory control over Palestine. Sentiments of friendship and 
sympathy towards Revisionist Zionism and its leader, Vladimir 
Jabotinsky, were repeatedly expressed by the Fascist regime and a 
school for training young Revisionists was open in 1934 and remained 
in activity until 1937 in the costal town of Civitavecchia.51 The private 
correspondence between Jabotinsky and Isacco Sciaky, the Italian 
Revisionist theorist, is in this context enlightening. In the early 1930s, 
the Revisionists’ attempts to open the dialogue with the Fascist regime 
intensified. In 1932, Jabotinsky approached the Italian embassy in Paris 
through an intermediary. He made his feelings towards Italy and 
Fascism clear and hoped to be able to count on the support of the 
Fascist regime. His short-term objective was to create a special school 
in Italy for those who wished to visit the Middle East; in return, 
Jabotinsky promised to boost Italian propaganda in Palestine. 
Jabotinsky would later claim that his activities as propagandist for the 
Fascist regime dated back to his youth in Ukraine, when, working as a 
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journalist, he began encouraging young people to study in Italian 
universities rather than in France or Eastern Europe.52 However, 
officials of the Italian Foreign Ministry were rather uneasy at the 
prospect of a meeting between Mussolini, as requested by Jabotinsky, 
and the Revisionist leader, for such an audience could be exploited by 
Zionist Revisionists in Palestine.53 The marriage of convenience 
between Fascist Italy and Revisionist Zionism was thus short-lived; 
Mussolini’s increasing distaste for mainstream Zionism, the growing 
tension in Palestine that culminated with the Arab rebellion of 1936-
1939, the rapprochement between Italy and Germany in the face of 
deteriorating Anglo-Italian relations brought the pro-Zionist rhetoric of 
the regime to a swift end. In March 1937, with a pompous ceremony in 
Tripoli, Mussolini was offered the “Sword of Islam”; the Duce 
gratefully accepted the new role bestowed on him, that of protector of 
the oppressed Arab nations. Isacco Sciaky for a short period of time 
encouraged Jabotinsky to persevere in the search of a contact with the 
Duce; in June 1937, following a disagreement between the Italian 
authorities in Palestine and the Jewish community, the Italian Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs reiterated – perhaps less convincingly – the 
government’s general feelings of sympathy towards Revisionist 
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Zionism, although the regime felt that it ought to maintain cordial 
relations with all political forces in Palestine, including the Arabs.54   
 
Conclusions 
In the 1930s, Italy’s policy of expansion on the opposite shore of the 
Mediterranean and in the Middle East was centred upon the 
development of a preferential partnership with Arab governments and 
nationalist movements, which would eventually replace the political 
and economic links created by the British empire. Throughout the 
colonial world, nationalist groups had sought the support of external 
forces capable of providing political, financial and military backing 
needed to overthrow foreign rulers. In the second half of the 1930s, the 
Axis powers attracted a remarkable degree of attention from radical 
fringes of the nationalist movements, determined to remove the last 
vestiges of the British empire. 
     Italy’s policies towards both Arab nationalists and Revisionist 
Zionists were characterised by ambiguity: the regime’s promise to pave 
the road for the independence of the Arab nations stands in stark 
contrast with the Fascist notion of empire-building as natural expansion 
of the nation. War and conquest sit at the heart of the Fascist ideology, 
whilst territorial expansion in the Mediterranean was regarded as the 
first step towards the recreation of the glory of the Roman empire. 
Likewise, Italy’s overtures to Zionism, and in particular that anti-
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British brand of Zionism, the Revisionist movement, were full of 
contradictions.  
     At the heart of Italian policies in the Mediterranean and the Middle 
East was the Fascist regime’s firm intention to compete with Britain 
and France on their own ground: the “least of the Great Powers”, as 
Italy was described, would rapidly build an empire at the expense of her 
major European competitors. To this end, an alliance with indigenous 
forces capable of challenging and eventually dismantling British and 
French imperial structures was indispensable. But mainstream Arab 
nationalist and Zionist forces remained by and large impervious to 
Mussolini’s charm and assessed the regime’s claims against the 
regime’s deeds: the massacre of the Senussi in Libya, the war in 
Abyssinia and the use of nerve gas against poorly equipped enemy 
troops cast serious doubt over Mussolini’s Arab policies; and, as far as 
the Zionists were concerned, Italy’s oscillating relations with Nazi 
Germany and its fascination with Arab nationalism, strengthened the 
perception of the regime as an unreliable ally. At the outbreak of the 
Second World War, few Arab leaders and no Arab government lent 
their assistance to the Axis powers, choosing to side with the Allies, 
despite their ties with Zionism and their role in creating and supporting 
a strong and viable Jewish national home in Palestine. Those Arabs and 
Muslims who did collaborate with the Axis powers represented a 
minority and more radical fringe of nationalist forces, what Herf 
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describes as «the extremist wing of a much broader anti-Zionist 
consensus».55  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
55
 HERF, Nazi Propaganda for the Arab World, cit., p. 264. 
  
 
 
